(1) Problem definition: Utility regulators are grappling to devise compensation schemes for customers who sell rooftop solar generation back to the grid, while safeguarding environmental interests, and the financial interests of utilities, solar system installers, and retail customers. This is difficult: Regulatory changes introduced in Nevada in 2015 to protect Nevada's utility induced SolarCity, the market leader in solar systems, to suspend operations in Nevada. We show that the choice of tariff structure is crucial to achieving socially desirable objectives.
Introduction
Rooftop solar has seen a boom in recent years, with residential rooftop solar installations consistently growing at over 20% year-on-year (Mike Munsell 2017) . One of the main catalysts for this growth has been the practice of utility companies offering "retail net-metering" to customers with solar panels: Under this scheme, these customers can sell any excess electricity their panels generate to their utility for full retail credit. Effectively, such customers pay only for their "net" usage.
While such an incentive is useful because a move to rooftop solar is environmentally desirable, retail net-metering threatens the profitability of utility companies, who are forced to buy excess energy from customers at retail rates which are significantly higher than their prevailing wholesale rates. A utility might commonly combat this by raising retail electricity rates for all users, or by reducing the rate at which utilities repurchase excess generation from solar households. However, both these solutions are problematic: If the utility company raises rates, (typically) poorer non-solar households would bear some part of the burden imposed by (typically) wealthier solar households (Krysti Shallenberger 2017a); this would result in cross-subsidization, a phenomenon under which one set of customers benefits at the cost of another set of customers. Alternately, if the repurchase rate is reduced, customers may no longer be incentivized to install solar, and solar installers could be put out of business. This latter dynamic played out recently in Nevada (Buhayar 2016) .
In each of the thirty-three U.S. states with regulated electricity markets, a body called the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) has the charge of solving this complex problem: In each of these states, the PUC balances the welfare of the various stake-holders by regulating the rates and services of public utilities. The PUCs can therefore be thought of as social welfare maximizers; in the context of rooftop solar, this means protecting utility company profitability and ensuring fair rates for customers, while providing a nourishing environment for rooftop solar in order to protect environmental interests (PUCs' stated objectives often explicitly include environmental stewardship; see California Public Utilities Commission (2017)). The PUC's task is further complicated by the fact that solar system installers (henceforth solar companies) are typically unregulated; therefore, regulatory interventions must account for such solar companies making self-interested decisions.
As might be expected, the effect of increased rooftop solar adoption on utility companies' profits has resulted in considerable regulatory flux: in the U.S., 42 of the 50 states took some action related to net-metering, rate design or solar ownership during the third quarter of 2015 alone (NC Clean Energy Technology Center and Meister Consultants Group 2015) . The PUC's regulatory tight-rope walk of balancing customer, societal and utility welfare is a tricky affair that has, on occasion, gone awry: NV Energy, the utility company in Nevada, imposes a simple two-part tariff: a monthly fixed charge and a variable "energy" charge per kWh of energy consumed. After being negatively impacted by increased rooftop solar adoption, NV Energy initiated a prolonged dialogue with their PUC, in which they raised the spectre of cross-subsidization (Chediak and Buhayar 2015) . The outcome of this dialogue was a ruling that solar customers would eventually pay thrice as high a fixed charge as non-solar customers, and would be credited for excess generation at wholesale rates (significantly lower than the existing retail rate). This announcement prompted SolarCity, the market leader in solar systems, to suspend operations in Nevada and cut over 500 jobs (Buhayar 2016) . In December 2016, a year after this ruling was made, the PUC reversed its stand, voting to restore retail net-metering and the original rate schedule in the Sierra Pacific territory (Pyper 2016) . Meanwhile in February 2017 in Maine, the PUC passed a bill to phase down compensation paid to customers for their excess generation. In July 2017, a new bill that aimed to roll back this decision in order to boost solar growth was vetoed by the Governor, who cited cross-subsidization as the reason for his decision: he said that net-metering subsidizes the cost of solar panels "at the expense of the elderly and poor who can least afford it" (Krysti Shallenberger 2017b).
There is no evident consensus on the structural properties a tariff should have in order to be Utility tariffs also vary in whether they discriminate between solar and non-solar customers. Nevada permits NV Energy to have solar and non-solar customers on different rate schedules, but states such as New Mexico and Washington explicitly disallow this. Meanwhile, Arizona Public Service (APS) has a tiered tariff structure that pays solar customers less than the retail rate for excess energy sold back, effectively putting them on different rate schedules from non-solar customers.
Motivated by such developments, we explore this delicate problem faced by the PUC's, focusing on how effective different tariff structures are in enabling the PUC to induce socially optimal welfare outcomes in an electricity market with rooftop solar. We do so by explicitly modeling the regulator's social welfare optimization problem and demonstrating that some common tariff forms are potentially inadequate to the task. We model a monopolistic, vertically integrated utility company (like NV Energy) whose tariffs are set by the PUC; a monopolistic, price-setting solar company (similar to SolarCity); and residential customers who are heterogeneous in their demands Article submitted to MSOM Sustainable Operations SIG 2018 and generation capability (available roof space)
1 . After the PUC fixes a tariff (upon negotiation with the utility company), the solar company and customers play a sequential game: the solar company sets the price of solar systems to maximize its profit, anticipating customers' decisions (made endogenously) to install solar or not. Customers make their self-interested installation decision based on their demand, rooftop solar generation potential, and excess generation that they expect to sell back to the grid (taken together, these determine a customer's "usage tier," or equivalently, "usage profile"), the tariff set by the PUC, and the solar company's declared price. Naturally, the regulator takes the behavior of the solar company and customers into account when deciding on a tariff.
A key element of our model is the endogenization of the (monopolistic) solar company's pricing decision, a departure from most existing literature. This is in keeping with the observation that over a third of the market share in the U.S. was claimed by one private company (SolarCity) in 2014 and 2015 (Roselund 2015) , that wields significant pricing power because of lower costs (Shahan 2016) . The endogenized solar pricing decision creates additional incentive compatibility constraints the regulator must account for, failing which the solar company may exit the market.
Using our model, we find two attributes that a tariff structure must have in order to guarantee effectiveness: the ability to discriminate between customers based on their usage tier, and the ability to discriminate between customers with and without rooftop solar. While APS's tariff structure has both these features, at least one of them is absent in the tariff structures of many other utilities, for example, NV Energy in Nevada and PNM Energy in New Mexico. In the absence of either one of these attributes, we show that the regulator might not be able to induce a socially optimal outcome, and often will have to resort to an outcome with cross-subsidization. We then show that a simple two-part tariff with these attributes, featuring full retail price repurchasing from residential solar customers, always guarantees feasibility of the regulator's social welfare optimization problem. We also show that if solar adoption generates an overall customer surplus (possibly at the expense off the utility), this tariff structure can guarantee an outcome with no cross-subsidization.
Complementary to our analysis, using consumer survey data obtained at the household level (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2009), we estimate customer usage profile parameters and numerically illustrate how our suggested tariff structure compares to the tariff structures currently in use in Nevada and New Mexico, two states wrestling with this issue. We find that 5 both states' tariffs perform poorly compared to our suggested tariff: while our tariff is able to avoid cross-subsidization in all test cases, the current tariffs in both states are not. Notably, in Nevada, use of the existing tariff structure most adversely affects (possibly low income) customers living in the smallest houses.
Literature Review
There is a substantial body of Operations Management literature exploring various aspects related to the management of renewable energy resources. Aflaki and Netessine (2016) and Hu et al. (2015) study capacity investment decisions for renewable resources such as wind and solar. The effect of tariff structures on such investments have been studied in Alizamir et al. (2016) , Ritzenhofen et al. (2016) , and Kok et al. (2015) . The operational aspects of managing renewable energy resources are studied in Zhou et al. (2014) , Kapuscinski (2013), and Al-Gwaiz et al. (2016) .
The energy policy literature contains a stream of work investigating regulatory considerations arising from the increase in distributed generation. Some of these papers, such as Keyes and Rábago (2013) and Lehr (2013) provide frameworks for regulation. Linvill et al. (2013) qualitatively discuss the challenges a regulator might face when implementing net-metering or feed-in tariffs for compensating distributed generation. Some studies such as Blackburn et al. (2014) , Borlick and Wood (2014) , Brown and Bunyan (2014) and Moore et al. (2016) find that current subsidy levels in tandem with net-metering tend to overcompensate customers for excess generation. NC Clean Energy Technology Center and Meister Consultants Group (2015) provides a comprehensive view of recent solar-related regulatory changes that have been effected in the 50 states in the U.S. Bird et al. (2013) describe the role of the regulator in a changing electricity landscape as: (1) Keeping the utility company viable, resulting in relatively stable cash flows and revenues from year to year; (2) Fairly apportioning the utility's cost of service among customers, without undue discrimination; and (3) Promotion of economic efficiency in the use of energy as well as competing products and services, without compromising on reliability. Our work draws on this description of the regulator's role: we formulate and solve an analytical model to explore which tariff structures enable the regulator to induce market outcomes in keeping with to these criteria.
Another stream within the energy policy literature studies the diffusion of solar among customers.
Simulation approaches are common (Denholm et al. 2009 ), and are used as a building block for many other pieces of research like Gagnon and Sigrin (2015) and Drury et al. (2013) . There is also a large body of empirical literature in this stream; see Ong et al. (2010) , Lobel and Perakis (2011) , Article submitted to MSOM Sustainable Operations SIG 2018 Bauner and Crago (2015) , Darghouth et al. (2011 ), Cai et al. (2013 , Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) , Rai and Sigrin (2013) , and Agarwal et al. (2015) for examples.
One possible response to solar adoption eroding their profits is for utility companies to raise electricity rates, making solar energy an even more attractive possibility further undermining utility profitability. This death spiral behavior is studied in Satchwell et al. (2015) , Costello and Hemphill (2014) , Denholm et al. (2009) and Darghouth et al. (2016) .
Closer to our work, Babich et al. (2017) take the perspective of a government entity deciding between offering a feed-in-tariff and a tax-rebate policy for rooftop solar installation. They study how the policy in place affects the solar panel investment decisions of a representative household in the presence of exogenous shocks that affect generation efficiency, variability in electricity price and solar panel investment cost (i.e. they have a dynamic model, but with exogenously given solar prices). Similar to Babich et al. (2017) , our work also deals with aspects of renewable energy that involve decisions by a principal (the PUC) and customers; however, our paper presents a static (rather than dynamic) model of solar adoption among heterogeneous customers who make potentially heterogeneous investment decisions, with a solar company that makes an endogenous pricing decision. Our model's static setting allows us to study the question of what the regulator's welfare-optimal choice of tariff should be, and our heterogeneous customer model allows us to study the customer equity implications of solar adoption. Goodarzi et al. (2015) take the perspective of a regulator who seeks to minimize utility costs by choosing an appropriate feed-in-tariff rate paid to customers who sell all rooftop generation back to the grid at that rate. In their model, customers are homogeneous in their demand characteristics but heterogeneous in their discount rates, and make a solar adoption decision based on the feed-in-tariff rate. Similar to our model, the solar system price in their model is also chosen endogenously by a profit maximizing solar company.
However, in contrast to their paper, we model customers who are heterogeneous in their demands and generation capabilities, and who sell only excess generation back to the grid. As mentioned above, our heterogenous customer model allows us to study the customer equity implications of the policies in place. Further, our regulator chooses the tariff structure and parameters: this generalizes the feed-in-tariff rate that Goodarzi et al.'s analysis is restricted to.
Our work also relates to the extensive literature on uniform versus non-linear pricing: we study what features a tariff structure must have in order for a regulator to be able to induce a socially optimal outcome. Varian (1989) and the references therein provide an elaborate discussion on various issues related price discrimination: tiered tariffs are a tool for second-degree price discrimination. While other papers such as Sundararajan (2004) and Choudhary et al. (2005) discuss non-linear pricing for certain specific situations, their findings are not directly applicable to our setting because of our model's unique characteristics: the tariff chosen by the regulator interacts with customers' strategic behavior through the price of solar (which customers use to decide whether to adopt solar or not). This tariff must be chosen so as to induce the monopolistic solar company to set a price of solar that will induce a socially optimal outcome.
Model
Our model considers residential customers who are heterogeneous in their usage profiles, a monopolistic solar company S, and a regulator R (the PUC). In addition, we model a vertically integrated utility company U that is subject to regulation by R (which makes decisions on behalf of U ).
We define our base case scenario as one with no solar systems, i.e. where all customers depend on U to satisfy all their demand for electricity. Customers are subject to flat-rate (rather than timeof-use, for tractability reasons) pricing. After S makes its product available, customers have the option of continuing to depend solely on U for their energy requirements, or installing solar systems, thereby reducing their dependence on U . We study how R's regulatory actions influence social welfare moving from the base case to the post-solar scenario. R's social welfare measurement takes into account financial and non-financial (i.e. environmental) considerations. However, customers and S are modeled as being self-interested, i.e. they maximize their own financial objectives.
We first detail the parameters that characterize each entity and define their decision variables.
• In Section 4 we discuss how our model may be extended to accommodate uncertainty in d, g, and e. Our base model also assumes that all households in a certain class make the same adoption decision. We also discuss in Section 4 how this assumption may be relaxed.
• Solar Company: We consider a self-interested, monopolistic, solar company that sets prices for its solar systems. This assumption is driven by prevailing market conditions: in the U.S.
SolarCity is the established market leader that has held a stable 34% market share in 2014
and 2015 (Roselund (2015) , about 3 times the market share of the nearest competitor) and lower costs, giving it the power to set market prices. We assume that solar panels are infinitely divisible (i.e. we ignore the topography, or solar panel-roof compatibility). S's decision variable is p s , the price that a customer who adopts solar must pay to the solar company per unit of electricity she generates using the installed solar system. SolarCity offers such a contract (this is called a Power Purchase Agreement), under which customers are only assessed a variable charge per kWh of generation, rather than having to pay a lump-sum amount for system purchase and installation (SolarCity 2016). For customer-owned systems that involve upfront payments, this price p s can be interpreted as a levelized price-the lifetime adjusted price per kWh that the system generates; this accounts for average sunlight received by the panel, efficiency considerations, down-payments, and maintenance costs. Since these are equivalent from a modeling standpoint, we consider a Power Purchase Agreement setup. Corresponding to the levelized price p s that S chooses, we assume that the levelized cost to S is c s per kWh of generation. Once set, p s is assumed to remain fixed. Customers in the U.S. can avail themselves of an investment tax credit of 30% on solar system purchases (Energy.gov 2017).
At the end of Section 3, we show how our model may be adjusted to accommodate this.
• Regulator: We consider a socially interested regulator R whose decision is a tariff function T (d , e, s) that governs the annual rate that the utility company charges a customer who draws an amount of energy d kWh/year from the grid, sells back e kWh/year to the grid and either adopts solar (s = 1), or does not adopt solar (s = 0). Note that both d and e are measurable by U with an appropriate metering system. Also observe that if s = 0, d = d and e = 0.
• Utility Company: We consider a monopolistic utility company U that faces a fixed annual grid maintenance cost f u and an average per unit cost of electricity c x u /kWh, where x is the amount of electricity it supplies. This framework allows us to capture the non-linear cost functions that utility companies typically face because changes in the amount of electricity they supply alter the mix of generation sources they use. The utility company uses its existing architecture to redistribute excess generation that it purchases from customers across the grid.
U does not take any decisions.
The game played by R, S and the customers proceeds in the following fashion: Let Period 0 be the base case scenario, when no households have rooftop solar. Under the Period 0 tariff structure, these customers pay a per unit energy cost of p r0 , and an annual fixed cost that we normalize to 0, without loss of generality. We use this particular base case tariff structure for simplicity, but our approach readily extends to any general base case tariff structure. In Period 1, R imposes tariff structure T (·). In response to tariff T (·), S sets a per unit solar rate p s in Period 2. In Period 3, individual customers, with knowledge of their demand d i , generation capability g i , and excess e i observe the tariff T (·) and the solar price p s and then endogenously decide to adopt solar (s * i = 1) or not to adopt solar (s * i = 0). Since the agents take actions sequentially, each agent's decision is taken anticipating other agents' responses in future periods.
We now present the objective functions that govern the decisions of each entity in our model:
• Customers: Customers wish to minimize their spend on electricity. Therefore, a class i customer solves the following problem:
• Solar Company: S maximizes profit by choosing an appropriate price of solar.
where s * i is the optimal adoption decision taken by a customer in tier i. We restrict p s to being larger than c s because S is unregulated may freely exit the market.
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• Regulator: The regulator R wishes to maximize social welfare improvement. Since R takes a systemic view, it is useful to think of the customers, U and S as belonging to a "system," we will consider two components of this social welfare improvement: Financial and Environmental.
(1) Financial: Note that all cash flows except the purchase of electricity at the purchase costs c x u and c s occur within the system and can therefore be ignored from the system's perspective. Define E 0 = electricity (which, in our case is a good estimate of c E 0 u ) in the U.S. is roughly $0.04 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2017). Solar production typically peaks around mid-day, creating the so-called duck curve (Jeff, St. John 2016) , and thus does not generally shave off the peak load (which typically occurs in the late evening) or displace the base load generators during low load periods (early in the morning). Therefore, we do not expect c
and c E 0 u are equal, the financial benefit simplifies to (c u − c s )∆ E (T (·)). Therefore, as long as c
and c E 0 u are close enough, we expect the financial benefit from solar adoption to be negative (because $0.04 < $0.065); this can be interpreted as a cost that society must bear in order to encourage solar adoption. As technological improvements cause c s to drop, the sign this benefit could flip. Our model is robust to either case.
It is worth pointing out that although we do not explicitly model the decisions of the utility company in response to R's actions, we implicitly capture any capacity changes that the utility company would need to make in response to R's actions through the parameters c
: since these depend on T (·), the impact of these capacity decisions on utility and system welfare are captured. The utility company has another role in our model: while choosing an adoption level that maximizes social welfare improvement, regulator R must ensure a specified rate-of-return to the utility company. We codify this by denoting the permissible increase in utility profit going from the base case to the post-solar case as ∆ U (note that this could be negative) 3 .
Further, she would like to ensure a profit of ∆ S to the solar company (for example, to encourage further technological innovation; we assume ∆ S > 0). Since the regulator is also responsible for making sure that customers do not overpay for electricity, she would like to choose, from among the functions T (·) that maximize her objective and respect the other constraints she faces, the one(s) that minimize the maximum cash outflow seen by any class of customers. We call this the fairness constraint. This is a common fairness criterion used in game theory and ethics credited to Rawls (Rawls 1974) . If this minimized maximum cash outflow is negative, then all classes of customers benefit, and there is no cross-subsidization because no class of customer is hurt by introduction of solar to the market. Formally, we represent these as constraints in R's optimization problem as follows:
where τ is the set of tariff structures that maximize the regulator's objective and satisfy all other constraints that she must account for. In Section 4, we precisely characterize τ .
While this set-up doesn't explicitly take into account the 30% investment tax credit from the federal government, this can easily be accommodated with minor adjustments to the model: we can now treat p s as the discounted rate that customers pay for solar power, and the solar company now obtains revenue at a rate ps 70%
per kWh of energy. All our results continue to hold under this modification, so we ignore the investment tax credit for the remainder.
Analysis
We begin our analysis by examining the optimization problem of a class i customer, as specified in
(1). Such a customer favors adopting solar if and only if
p s ≤ T (d i , 0, 0) − T (d i , e i , 1) g i t
(i) (we break ties in favor of adoption). These values of t(i) depend on T (·): specifying T (·) induces an ordering
among the t(i) values. For a given solar price p s the set of classes that adopt is {i :
Now consider S's pricing decision. We can assert that S's optimal choice of p s must be either t(i) for some i ∈ {1, . . . I} or some price larger than max i t(i): If S chose some price p s between t(i) and t(j) for some i and j such that t(j) = min k t(k) : t(k) > p s , she could do strictly better by choosing price t(j) as doing so increases S's margin and does not alter her volume (see equation (2)). Therefore, S's optimization problem reduces to choosing an i * such that the profit obtained by setting p s = t(i * ) is larger than the profit obtained from all other choices j = i * or choosing
We clarify that all adopting customers pay the chosen solar price p s ; t(i) is simply a threshold value of p s upto which a class i customer is induced to adopt solar.
These observations allow us to rewrite R' s optimization problem, folding in the decisions of S and households to reflect the sequence in which they are taken. To do so, we define some more 
. Now, notice that R's objective function (3) is affected by T (·) only through ∆ E . Therefore, R's decision can be equivalently modeled as choosing z optimally from the set {1, 2, . . . , 2 I }. In order for this value of z to induce adoption outcome s (z) , it must be the case that p s is chosen so that
Since p s is chosen from among the set of t(i) values, which as functions of T (·) are themselves variables, R may allow any (indeed, more than one) of the adopting classes in A (z) to be marginal. Let M be the set of indices of the marginal adopting classes. Since we assumed that at least one class adopts, this set must be nonempty. We can now pose R's optimization problem, folding in the household and solar company decision as follows:
Subject to constraints:
Here, (8) defines t(i) in terms of the regulator's decision variables, (9) ensures that the choice of marginal adopting classes is consistent with the choice of z, (10) ensures that U receives the specified rate of return implied by ∆ U , (11) imposes the fairness constraint on customer payments, (12) ensures that S achieves the specified profit ∆ S by choosing solar price t(m), m ∈ M , (13) is a set of incentive compatibility constraints, which ensure that S can do no better than make profit ∆ S by setting p s = t(i) for i / ∈ M 4 , and (14)- (15) induce customers in A (z) to adopt solar.
This formulation is not expressed in a convenient form, and is therefore not amenable to analysis:
τ is ill-defined in (11), and (13) and (9) are not expressed in canonical form, because they deal with set containment and the indicator function. However, by imposing the following restriction on tariff function T (·), we can convert this problem into a form that is easier to analyze.
Tariff restriction: Tariff function T (·) is chosen so that all t(i) values are distinct.
Proposition 1. The tariff restriction does not affect the regulator's ability to maximize her objective (7). Further, this restriction does not compromise her ability to meet all constraints, including the fairness constraint (11).
Proof: Presented in Appendix A
Therefore, the regulator can, without loss of optimality, choose a tariff function that ensures that all t(i) values are distinct. We can now decompose R's problem neatly by making the observation that the objective function expressed in (7) depends only on z and can therefore be solved independently of the constraints. Accordingly, we can carry out the following steps:
1. Find the value z * of z that maximizes the objective function. We call this problem P 1 .
2. Corresponding to the value of z * chosen, we can enumerate all underlying orderings over the t(i) values that could have resulted in adoption outcome s (z * ) . These feasible underlying orderings can be obtained by permuting the ordering of adopters (which we can do in exactly
, and for each of these orderings, permuting the non-adopters (which we can do in (I − |A
be the set of these orderings and let o be an index into these orderings. Observe that |O
Note that fixing the ordering over the t(i) values automatically fixes the marginal adopting class: pick the index corresponding to the adopting class chosen to have the lowest t(i) value according to o. Let m(o) be the marginal adopting class. 4 We model these incentive compatibility constraints as being strict rather than weak, because if S deviates to a price ps = t(m), the outcome induced is different from the desired z. We will show in Section 4.3 that if the tariff structure is appropriately chosen, this strict inequality does not impair the feasibility of the problem.
3. Use the value of z * so obtained to solve |O (z * ) | different optimization problems (which we can index by o), one for each possible ordering, setting (11) as the objective. Choose an ordering with the best objective value. We call this problem P 2 .
We can formally write these problems as follows:
Once the optimal z * is obtained, solve the following |O (z * ) | optimization problems (which are now in canonical form) and choose the solution with the best objective value.
Problem P 2 :
Here, (21) is a set of I − 1 inequalities that impose an ordering of the t(i) values consistent with o.
Observe that optimization problem P 1 always has a solution because it is unconstrained. However, it is not clear that P 2 is feasible. In particular, it is not immediately clear that the tariff parameters can ensure that the incentive compatibility constraints (23) and the ordering constraints (21) can hold together. In relation to this observation, we answer the following question:
Let T be the set of allowable tariff functions from which T (·) must be chosen. How does the choice of T affect the feasibility of P 2 ? Further, if P 2 is feasible, can it induce an outcome free from cross-subsidization?
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For an outcome to be free from CS, we naturally require that the total improvement in financial welfare for customers ∆ C = c
We examine how the choice of T affects the regulator's ability to induce outcomes free from CS when ∆ C ≥ 0; specifically, is ∆ C ≥ 0 sufficient to induce such a CS-free outcome?
4.1. Non-tiered Tariff Structure that discriminates between adopters and non-adopters
Many states in the U.S. (including Nevada, which we examine more closely in Section 5) have utility companies that administer non-tiered rate schedules for residential customers. Non-tiered tariff structures have the benefit of being simple to administer and therefore simple to modify in the rate case proceedings, the process by which utility companies petition for rate changes to the PUC.
These non-tiered structures can, however, discriminate between solar adopters and non-adopters, i.e., these two types of customers may be subject to different rate schedules, as is the case with NV Energy in Nevada. We study such rate structures in this section.
Let T be the set of linear, non-tiered tariff structures that discriminate between adopters and non-adopters, i.e., they are on different rate schedules. T has the following general specification:
We now present an analysis of the tariff structure (24). Specifically, we examine whether the feasibility of P 2 is guaranteed under this tariff structure. We prove the following propositions:
Proposition 2. Tariff structure (24) cannot guarantee the feasibility of P 2 : there exist parameters and outcomes z * , ∆ S , ∆ U for which P 2 is not feasible for any ordering o.
Proof: Please see Appendix B
Proposition 2 implies that the system (8)- (13) does not always have a solution. While this is discouraging, the following proposition shows that under a restriction on z * , there does exist a feasible ordering of P 2 if we drop the IC constraints.
Proposition 3. In the absence of the incentive compatibility constraints (13), there exists an ordering o for which tariff structure (24) guarantees the feasibility of optimization problem P 2 if z * = {i * , i * + 1, . . . , I} for some i * .
Proof: Please see Appendix C
This has an important implication: if the solar price p s were also controlled by the regulator R, and z * prescribes that a contiguous block of high-generation customer tiers adopts, a linear tariff structure with non-tiered rates would suffice to satisfy system (8)- (13), as the regulator would not have to contend with IC constraints (13). Alternatively, if the utility company itself offered rooftop solar rather than an outside firm, the IC constraints could be ignored (as the solar price set by U would now be subject to regulation) and equation (10) suitably modified.
The intuition for this tariff's failure to achieve feasible outcomes is its limited ability to transfer welfare among customers in different tiers. In particular, its ability to selectively make solar unattractive to some tiers and not to others is limited by not having tier-dependent parameters.
The conditions laid out in Proposition 3 remove some of these hurdles.
While dropping the IC constraints is a special case under which the linear tariff structure suffices, the current environment in the US is one with an unregulated solar company. Therefore, a richer class of tariff structures may be required to satisfy the constraints of P 2 .
Tiered tariff structure that does not discriminate between solar adopters and non-adopters
In states such as New Mexico (which we study in detail in Section 5) and Washington, the PUCs have mandated that solar customers may not be assessed any additional standby, capacity, interconnection, or other fee or charge by the utility (NC Clean Energy Technology Center 2017a,b).
Such a rule serves as an incentive for solar adoption. These tariff structures may be tiered, but operate under a single rate schedule, and feature retail net-metering, whereby customers who adopt solar sell back excess electricity at their retail rate: If the utility repurchased electricity at less than their retail rate this would be considered a fee to solar adopters, and is thus prohibited. Let
T be the set of such tariff functions. We will show that operating such a tariff structure, while guaranteeing feasibility, limits the ability of the regulator to induce a CS-free market outcome.
Under such a tariff structure, the appropriate rate class (not to be confused with usage class i ∈ {1, 2, . . . I}) in the rate schedule is applied based on a household's net demand. Recall that this net demand is d − g if they adopt solar. For instance, if a tier 1 household does not adopt solar, demands an amount of electricity d 1 , and is placed in rate class 1, a tier 2 household who adopts solar and has a net demand of d 2 − g 2 = d 1 also falls into rate class 1 and is billed as such.
Let C = {1, 2, . . . , |C|} be the set of indices corresponding to rate classes in U 's rate schedule.
Arrange this set in order of increasing (net) demand, i.e., rate class 1 corresponds to the lowest net c ∈ C, and f is a fixed cost that all customers pay. The tariff function is fully defined by choosing r c , ∀c ∈ C, and f . Note that having the fixed cost f also depend on class, i.e., having a different fixed cost f c for every class c, is equivalent to the system currently under consideration, as r c can be suitably modified for each class c to compensate for the difference f c − f .
Proposition 4. Corresponding to every ordering o and outcome z * , there exists a feasible rate schedule (r c , f ) that satisfies the constraints of P 2 .
Proof: Presented in Appendix D
While this tariff structure can always feasibly induce an outcome characterized by z * , ∆ S , ∆ U , we find that it cannot guarantee a CS-free outcomes when ∆ C ≥ 0.
Proposition 5. The tiered tariff structure that does not discriminate between adopters and non-adopters cannot guarantee CS-free outcomes: there exist parameters and outcomes z * , ∆ S , ∆ U for which no CS-free outcome can be generated for any ordering o even when ∆ C ≥ 0.
Proof: Presented in Appendix E
Therefore, while this tariff structure is simple and guarantees feasibility, it does not have desirable properties with respect to customer equity. Intuitively, this tariff fares better than the non-tiered tariff studied in Section 4.1 because its tiered nature allows welfare transfer among tiers. However, its ability to shield customers from cross-subsidization is limited by the fact that adopters and non-adopters may be grouped into the same tier. Therefore, a tariff structure that can guarantee CS-free outcomes must (at least) be able to discriminate between solar adopters and non-adopters by placing them in different rate schedules.
Tiered tariff structure that differentiates between solar adopters and non-adopters
As an alternative to the class of tariff structures explored in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, consider a tiered tariff structure that presents different rate schedules to solar and non-solar customers. Both these attributes are present in the tariff structure operated by Arizona's APS. We propose and study a specific tariff structure τ with these attributes: one that is non-tiered for non-adopters 5 and tiered for adopters. Under our structure, solar and non-solar customers are charged the same variable energy charge based on their net energy consumption 6 , but a solar customer is also assessed a fixed annual charge that depends on her class i. τ has the following general specification:
Note that U can infer a solar customer's class by observing the value of d i , the energy drawn from the grid, and contract on a fixed cost that a customer would pay based on this amount. We now present an analysis of tariff structure (25): we show that the feasibility of P 2 is guaranteed under such a tariff structure, and that it can also guarantee no CS if ∆ C ≥ 0.
Consider problem P 2 for a given ordering o and a given adoption outcome z * . It will be useful to re-order the indices to be consistent with o, that is, the indices are chosen such that t(i) < t(j), ∀i < j. As a result of this re-ordering, classes 1, . . . m − 1 do not adopt solar, while classes m, . . . , I adopt, where m is the index of the marginal adopter. Note that now, we no longer have g i < g j , ∀i < j.
Because this tariff structure has more parameters than the non-tiered tariff structure in (24), it might at first seem intuitive (and trivial) that this structure guarantees feasibility of P 2 : one could correctly make the observation that the fixed costs for adopting customer classes i can be chosen arbitrarily to adjust the ∆ U up and down. However, these fixed costs must also result in the solar price of p s = t(m) being an incentive compatible choice for S: picking a solar price p s = t(m) must result in a smaller profit (the product of margin and volume, see equation (30)) than her profit from picking p s = t(i). This deviation can be made sufficiently unattractive by ensuring that values t(i) for i = m are low enough; R can achieve this by manipulating the values of f i , i = m (see equation (26)). But this, again, imposes restrictions on our choice of fixed costs f i . However, our proposed two-part tariff, like the one in Section 4.2, guarantees the feasibility of P 2 .
Proposition 6. Corresponding to every ordering o and outcome z * , ∆ U , ∆ S , there exists a feasible tariff function of the form (25) that satisfies the constraints of P 2 .
Proof: First, find f m as a function of p r by solving equation (29) 
Note that by definition, this set of t(i) values satisfies (26) and (29). Further, IC constraints (30) are satisfied because the t(i) values for i > m are set smaller than what they would have to be to obtain a profit of ∆ S , and for i < m are set so low that they generate a negative profit. Finally, the ordering constraints (28) are satisfied for i < m by definition, and for i ≥ m (if the term is sufficiently small) because h j g j > 0, ∀j, leading to I j=i h j g j decreasing in i. Once these f i values have been set, substitute them in (27) to obtain a value for p r . Q.E.D.
This tariff (25) features the same energy (variable) cost across tiers, and varying fixed costs f i by tier for solar customers. Similar to our discussion in Section 4.1, R could equivalently impose a tariff featuring the same fixed costs across tiers, with energy costs varying across adopting tiers. This is a commonly used tariff, where a customer's rate schedule features varying energy rates per kWh of usage that depend on the usage level. We now study properties of this tariff structure. (26)). Therefore, we have
We now address properties that this tariff structure exhibits with respect to customer equity and CS. Lemma 1 will be useful in examining these properties.
Proposition 7. When ∆ C > 0, there exists an ordering o such that tariff structure (25) can induce an outcome that is CS-free. When ∆ C = 0, tariff structure (25) can induce an outcome that is arbitrarily close to being CS-free.
Proof: Presented in Appendix F.
Under some conditions, we can provide a closed form characterization of the solution to P 2 . Proposition 8. The solution to P 2 can be characterized in closed form when ∆ C > 0 and l :
, that is, the lowest demand tier does not adopt solar.
Proof: Presented in Appendix G.
Therefore, our proposed tariff structure (25) is guaranteed to be feasible, has desirable properties with respect to customer equity, and its solution can even be characterized in closed form when adopting solar creates a customer surplus.
Practical Issues/Extensions
Some practical hurdles stand in the way of implementing tariff structure (25). We now discuss these issues and how they may be remedied.
1. Demand, generation and excess are not actually deterministic: Our model assumes deterministic values for households h i , demand d i , generation capacity g i , and excess e i . However, this will not be true in practice: households' usage and generation parameters are random variables. We can relax the deterministic assumption by allowing individual households to draw d, g, and e from a discrete distribution with I points in its support. We define a joint probability mass function φ(d, g, e) over the space of possible values of d, g, and e. Let us index the support of φ(·) by i. Now,
where H is the total number of households in the market. In expectation h i customers will have demand d i , generation g i and excess e i . Thus, with this definition of h i , we can reformulate programs P 1 and P 2 in terms of expectations, and h i customers will make a decision consistent with the deterministic tier i decision.
2. Not all customers belonging to a class that is induced to adopt solar will actually adopt: For various reasons including access to liquidity and inertia to change, some customers belonging to a tier designated to adopt solar might not actually make the adoption decision.
We can easily relax this assumption. Let π i be an exogenously given expected fraction of households in tier i that would adopt solar if economically viable (endogenous determination of π i is beyond the scope of this model). The remaining 1 − π i fraction of households in tiers
= 1 continue to fulfill their demand from the utility directly, because they are unwilling to adopt solar. We can then reformulate our model by replacing h i by π i h i in the solar profit equations, and adjusting the utility company's rate-of-return equation appropriately.
3. The tariff structure may incentivize customers to exaggerate their demand to generate bill savings: It is undesirable for a tariff structure to incentivize a type i customer to "spoof" a type j customer by exaggerating her demand in order to generate bill savings, Article submitted to MSOM Sustainable Operations SIG 2018 that is, her total outflow (to U and S) is reduced by spoofing another class 7 . Therefore, we must consider the four possible ways a customer type may spoof another customer type.
(i) Non-Solar to Non-Solar: Non-solar customer i can appear to be non-solar customer j by exaggerating her demand tod i = d j > d i . However, doing so increases her bill from
, so she will not do so.
(ii) Non-Solar to Solar: Non-solar customer i can appear to belong to a tier j that adopts solar by installing solar that generates g i and appearing to have a grid usage of
To do so, she must alter her demand tod i = (d j − g j + e j ) + g i − e i . This is
To prevent this from happening, we
, it is sufficient for us to specify parameters such that:
(iii) Solar to Non-Solar: Solar customer i can appear to be a non-solar customer j by
To prevent this from happening, we must ensure that
and therefore, such a customer i will not spoof a non-solar customer j.
(iv) Solar to Solar: Solar customer i can appear to be another solar customer j by appearing to have a grid usage of d j = d j − g j + e j . To do so, she must alter her demand
which is identical to the condition in inequality (31).
Such spoofing behaviors can be eliminates in various ways. For example, constraint (31) could be added to P 2 for classes falling into (ii) and (iv) above, that is, for all classes i, j such that
and either i is a non-adopter and j is an adopter, or both i and j are adopters. Whether P 2 remains feasible under these constraints depends on the specific parameters under consideration. We show in Section 5 that P 2 's feasibility and CS outcome is unaffected by the inclusion of these constraints for realistic parameter values. If the regulator 7 We do not discuss the case of a customer curtailing her demand in order to generate bill savings because we do not model demand response and the costs associated with curtailing demand.
chooses not to enforce this constraint in P 2 , she can use it to check if the solution obtained is exposed to such spoofing behavior. Alternatively, U could assign a class not just by measuring grid usage, but also by measuring net demand d i − g i and assigning a class on the basis of both these measurements. Such a measurement would deter spoofing behavior, because except under pathological parameter values, simply exaggerating demand will not allow a type i customer to mimic a type j customer on both these dimensions.
4. The tariff structure may incentivize customers to install solar capacity strictly less than g i : It is undesirable for this tariff structure to induce solar customers to install solar capacity smaller than g i . Observe that if a tier i customer's generation is reduced tõ g i < g i , her excess also reduces to someẽ i ≤ e i . This might or might not alter her tier (which, recall, is measured by measuring her grid usage d − (g − e)). Suppose it does not result in a tier alteration. In this case we can impose the constraint p s < p r so that installing less than capacity g i will increase a customer's bill by an amount p r per unit of generation foregone and this bill increase is not compensated for by having to purchase less from S. To ensure that
But what if the customer was able to change her tier, and therefore, the applied fixed cost by installing panels to less than capacity? Let us assume that for every possibleg i < g i , R can infer the resulting excessẽ i based on the customer's usage profile over the day. Such a customer can spoof a tier j customer by choosing capacityg i such that
all such pairs ofg i ,ẽ i values, impose constraint (32), in addition to f m > 0.
Note that we need not consider the possibility of a customer altering both d i and g i to exaggerate her grid usage d i : Decreasing g i by one unit increases her cash outflow by p r − p s , while increasing d i by one unit increases her cash outflow by p r , which is larger than p r − p s .
We shall see in Section 5 that for realistic parameter values, p s < p r because the prescribed fixed cost f m for the marginal tier m is positive. We shall also see in Section 5 that for realistic parameter values, moving to a higher tier causes customers to incur higher fixed costs, and therefore, reducing g i -even to effect a change in tier-is not beneficial.
Numerical Analysis
Now, using data from the states of Nevada and New Mexico-where regulatory changes threaten the rooftop solar industry-we study how the tariff structures in operation compare to the two-part tiered tariff structure presented in (25). We first discuss our approach to estimating the parameters d, g, e, and h in Section 5.1. Using these parameters, in Section 5.2 we numerically investigate the performance of using the specific versions of the non-tiered, linear tariff structure proposed in the states of Nevada and New Mexico. We contrast these to results obtained if the states were to adopt our proposed tiered two-part tariff structure. As we will see, while both states' tariffs are able to feasibly generate the outcome z * specified by P 1 , they induce poor customer equity outcomes in problem P 2 .
Estimating the Parameters
Our starting point for estimating the parameters of the system is the household micro-data from For each housing unit, we estimate the value g i : we take the total area of each house in square feet, as reported in the data set, and divide by the number of stories to obtain an estimate of the total roof area. Then, we assume that each square foot of panel area can generate 9 Watts of electricity when the sun is shining (Solar-Estimate 2012) to obtain the rated power output of solar panel installations. This estimate is an approximation of installed capacity, because total household area reported in the survey also includes basements and attics, where they are present. Moreover, not all available roof space is typically usable for solar panels. Accordingly, we correct this estimate (as a first approximation) by a single multiplicative factor such that installation sizes so obtained are roughly in the 3 kWh -10 kWh range (Fu et al. 2016) . We multiply this installation capacity by 2190, the estimated number of hours of sun in Nevada and by 2471 hours of sun for New
Mexico to estimate the generation per year for households in each state (SolarDirect 2016). We group these households into 4 roughly equally sized buckets (i = 1 . . . 4) based on their generation capacity. Within each bucket i, we compute the average energy demanded, d i and the average generation capacity g i . Bucket size h i is computed as the proportion of these households belonging to generation bucket i (we normalize the total number of households to 1). Since Using the US Department of Energy data on hourly residential load in a typical meteorological year for cities in Nevada and New Mexico (US Department of Energy 2013), we find that residences in Nevada typically consume about µ = 29% of their demand between the hours of 11 a.m. and 6 p.m., typical hours for solar reliance. This figure is about µ = 34% for New Mexico. Since we do not have this data broken up by household class, we assume that all houses consume this proportion of their demand when the sun is shining, and use this to estimate e i , the excess generation they would be able to sell back to the grid as max (0, g i − µd i ).
The results of this exercise are presented in Appendix H. We use these parameters in our analysis.
Comparison of tariff structures
We now wish to compare the tariff structures in operation in Nevada and New Mexico to our suggested two-part tiered tariff structure. We are particularly interested in understanding how these tariff structures perform with respect to their ability to induce CS-free outcomes. To do so, we set ∆ C = 0 and compare tariff structures. (If ∆ C < 0, then CS is unavoidable; as ∆ C increases above zero, CS-free outcomes become easier to induce.) We ignore the federal investment tax credit because it will ramp down starting in 2019 (Energy.gov 2017).
As noted in Section 4, not all customers who are financially incentivized to install solar do so; we attempt to capture this inertia in our experiments, by letting π i be the proportion of class i households that adopt solar if financially prudent. Equivalently, this may be interpreted as the probability that a class i household that is financially incentivized to adopt solar does so.
We estimate a reference level of π i for each class and state in our data set using data from the We scale these π i values to reflect optimistic and pessimistic adoption scenarios. Under the optimistic scenario, if all classes adopt at the specified π i levels, 3% of all residential energy, the current level in California, (California Distributed Generation Statistics 2017, Ivan Penn 2017) will be supplied by rooftop solar. Under the pessimistic scenario, if all classes adopt at these π i levels, 1% of all residential energy will be supplied by rooftop solar. Appendix I shows the resulting π i
Article submitted to MSOM Sustainable Operations SIG 2018 levels. To study this situation with partial adoption within a class we reformulate P 1 so that E (z) values (the migration quantity corresponding to outcome z) accurately reflect the change in energy demanded from U given adoption levels π i . A reformulated version of P 2 is presented in Appendix K.
In our numerical study, we use a c s value of $0.059074 for Nevada $0.052356 for New Mexico. We compute this using a 30 year lifetime (SolarCity 2016c) for solar systems that produce power at 200 Watts per panel (SolarCity 2016b), with output degrading at a rate of 0.5% per year (Jordan et al. 2010 ) and a per Watt cost of $2.89.
Next, we turn to estimation of c We now individually consider the cases of Nevada and New Mexico. Since we are interested in studying customer equity outcomes, we set ∆ S = 0.0001, and set ∆ U so that ∆ C = 0 according to
We compare the performance of our tariff structure and the tariff structure in operation on both the pessimistic and the optimistic adoption scenarios. For each state, for each type of scenario, we carry out the following steps:
1. Enumerate the objective value of P 1 for all 16 possible outcomes (each tier may either be incentivized to adopt or not). Choose the z * with the best objective value.
2. Corresponding to this solution z * , find the solution of P 2 for all possible orderings o using the tariff structure in operation in the state. Choose the solution with the best objective value. 3. Corresponding to this solution z * , find the solution of P 2 for all possible orderings o using our suggested two-part tiered tariff structure, including the constraints required to ensure that customers are not encouraged to spoof their demands or generation amounts to generate bill savings. Choose the solution with the best objective value.
Nevada
For both the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios in Nevada, we find that the solution to P 1 corresponds to all four classes of customers adopting solar. In the optimistic scenario, the objective value of P 1 is $1.46, and for the pessimistic scenario, $0.49. Recall that these are normalized net welfare improvements per-household.
NV Energy in Nevada operates a non-tiered tariff structure. After the changes in 2015, NV Energy published a memo to its customers, providing an overview of the changes they would see in their bill (NV Energy 2015) . According to these changes, solar customers would be compensated at less than retail rates for excess energy sold back to the grid, and would pay different fixed costs from non-solar customers. However, there was to be no change to the energy charge (the per-unit) energy rate for solar and non-solar customers. Accordingly, we use tariff structure (24), restricting r d to be equal to s d . We use a value of p r0 = $0.10182, the average value of the rates in Northern and Southern Nevada (NV Energy 2017). The results of our experiments are summarized in Table   1 . We see that in both the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, the objective value of P 2 using the current non-tiered tariff is quite large-indicating the presence of CS-compared to that of our suggested tariff (where it is near 0). Therefore, this outcome constitutes a situation of CS. We see that tier 1 and 2 customers are adversely affected by a move to solar. Further, the most strongly impacted households are tier 1 customers, who are also potentially the poorest customers with smaller houses and lower demand.
New Mexico
As was the case with Nevada, for both the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios in New Mexico, we find that the solution to P 1 corresponds to all four classes of customers adopting solar. In the Now, we consider the modifications required to the tariff structure in the post-solar case. Recall that a class c customer's bill under this tariff structure is of the form r c n + f , where n is the net demand of the customer being considered. From the estimates of d and g in Table 4 , we compute the net demand (d − g) values for all tiers, if they were to adopt. A tier 1 customer who adopts has a net demand of 3031 kWh, a tier 2 customer who adopts has a net demand of 1482 kWh, a tier 3 customer who adopts has a net demand of 2356 kWh, and a tier 4 customer who adopts has a net demand of −2001 kWh (tier 4 customers are net suppliers). In order to give additional flexibility to the New Mexico tariff, we add a fifth rate class that applies to net demands of up to 5900 kWh. This fifth rate class will then apply to all households that adopt solar 9 . The table in Appendix J summarizes the rate classes under consideration.
We compare New Mexico's tiered tariff structure to a variant of our tariff structure discussed in Section 4.3, where we have fixed costs that vary by tier in order to accommodate the fact that p r0
varies by tier (please see footnote 5 in Section 4.3). We also impose constraints to make rates r i , ∀i positive. The results of our experiments are summarized in Table 2 . Under both tariffs, the solutions are identical the pessimistic and optimistic scenarios. These show a similar situation to Nevada's where tiers 1 and 2 are affected. Here, the most adversely affected customers are those in tier 2.
In summary, although Proposition 2 showed that P 2 might not be feasible under the non-tiered 9 Adding a new rate class for each net-demand usage level will implicitly enable the New Mexico tariff to distinguish between solar and non-solar customers, making it equivalent to our tariff. Table 2 Bill Comparisons -New Mexico Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios tariff structure (24), we did not encounter infeasibility in our experiments for Nevada. However, while feasible, the non-tiered linear tariff structures in Nevada and New Mexico performed poorly compared to our tiered tariff structure with respect to their ability to avoid CS: In Nevada, under both the pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, the customers most affected by the introduction of solar belonged tier 1. These are the households with the smallest rooftops, possibly housing lowerincome residents. In New Mexico, the most adversely affected customers were customers in tier 2, which shows that no class of rate-payers can be assured of not being forced into cross-subsidization.
In contrast, our tiered tariff structure was able to avoid CS even after we imposed constraints to prevent customers from exaggerating their demand to realize bill savings. These experiments serve to illustrate the crucial role that tariff structure plays in helping to ensure equity across customers.
Conclusions and Future Work
There has been considerable regulatory flux associated with rooftop solar energy in the past few years. The regulator's task of trading off the interests of the utility company, the solar company, different consumers and society at large is clearly a challenging one. In some cases regulatory changes have had dire consequences: changes introduced in the state of Nevada all but killed the solar industry in the state.
In this paper we study the regulator's problem of choosing a tariff function to induce a socially optimal outcome. The regulator takes into account financial and environmental considerations, and operates in a setting with a monopolistic, price-setting solar company and customers who individually decide whether or not to install solar. We pose the regulator's decision as an optimization problem which we show can conveniently be hierarchically separated into two subproblems. We show analytically that the tariff structure chosen must have the ability to discriminate across customer usage tiers and the ability to discriminate between solar and non-solar customers in order to guarantee feasibility. We present a tariff structure with both these features and show that in addition to guaranteeing feasibility, it also can guarantee outcomes free from cross-subsidization when solar adoption generates a surplus for the customer base. The implication is that regulators must migrate to tiered tariff structures and put solar and non-solar customers on different rate This work lays the foundation for several research extensions. For instance, our model considers a flat-rate pricing scheme, rather than a time-of-use (TOU) pricing scheme such as the one being rolled out in California. While TOU is yet to gain significant traction in the U.S., modeling this explicitly could eventually become critical to analyzing policy decisions related to solar, as having a TOU pricing scheme incentivizes customers to shift their demand profiles temporally (demand response). Capturing demand response would also modify our model's current assumption that the aggregate demand for electricity is unaffected by solar adoption. In addition, our work models the solar company as being monopolistic. Another possible avenue for future research is to explicitly model competition in the solar marketplace, with the utility itself potentially being a competitor in the solar domain. Similarly, while our model implicitly captures the impact of utility capacity investments in response to solar adoption through c x u and m x u , one could consider a model in which these decisions are explicit outputs of the model. And, on the customer side, we could modify the assumption that all customers (or an exogenously defined proportion) who are incentivized to adopt solar do so. An interesting extension would be to endogenously determine the proportion of customers in a tier that would adopt solar as a function of savings generated.
While this work explores a static setting, related questions can be explored in a dynamic setting, complementing literature such as Babich et al. (2017) and Lobel and Perakis (2011) . Such work would require a significantly different model that captures the diffusion of solar among customers, the interaction between solar adoption penetration and solar cost, and utility capacity investment decisions. If such work also continued to capture heterogeneity in the customer base, this would necessitate more nuanced modeling of the regulator's optimization problem.
Supplementary Material
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 First, notice that R's objective function does not depend directly on T (·), but only on z. Therefore, if she can choose a value of z that maximizes her objective function, and find M and T (·) that satisfy her constraints (and therefore induce adoption outcome z), her ability to maximize her objective is not compromised by this restriction. Fixed a value of z and consider a solution that does not follow this restriction. We now show that this solution can be converted to one that respects this restriction all of R's constraints.
Let O be the set of indices i such that ∃j : t(i) = t(j). Partition O into O n , the set of indices in O corresponding to non-adopting classes, O an , the set of indices in O corresponding to adopting classes that are not marginal classes, and O am , the set of indices in O corresponding to adopting classes that are marginal. Now, carry out the following steps.
1. Sequentially, for each i ∈ O n , decrease t(i) by a small value i > 0 by appropriately increasing T (d i , e i , 1).
Note that doing this does not affect (11) because this equation is only affected by T (d i , 0, 0) for non-adopting classes. Further, since i > 0, we can ensure that the tariff restriction is respected, the inequalities in (13) continue to be respected, and the inequalities in (15) continue to be respected.
2. Sequentially, for each i ∈ O an , decrease t(i) by a small value i > 0 by appropriately decreasing T (d i , 0, 0).
Note that doing this does not affect (11) because this equation is only affected by T (d i , e i , 1) for adopting classes. Further, if i is small enough and appropriately chosen, we can ensure that the tariff restriction is respected, the inequalities in (13) continue to be respected, and the inequalities in (14) continue to be respected because t(i) is still larger than t(m). Now, consider the set O am . Of these, choose exactly one class m to be the marginal class. For all i ∈ O am \m, sequentially increase t(i) by a small value i by appropriately increasing T (d i , 0, 0). Note that doing this does not affect (11) because this equation is only affected by T (d i , e i , 1) for adopting classes. Further, if i is small enough and appropriately chosen, we can ensure that the tariff restriction is respected. Since these t(i) values are larger than t(m) the incentive compatibility constraints (13) corresponding to these classes will now be respected for a small enough i , because if S sets a price t(i), since t(i) is now larger than t(m) class m does not adopt, therefore decreasing the quantity in the summation term of (13) by at least h m g m . Naturally, (14) continues to hold as t(i) is now larger than t(m). 
Solving for r 0 − s 0 using equation (38) 
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
To prove this property, we choose a number > 0 and consider a net-metering tariff system (where customers pay a variable charge proportional to their net energy usage). We choose the ordering t(i) < t(j), ∀i < j, which is consistent with classes m, m + 1, . . . , I being adopters. Setting r d = s d , s e = −s d , and r 0 = s 0 − , the ordering constraints t(i) < t(j) simplify to s d − g i < s d − g j , which is true, because g i < g j . This leaves us with a linear system of the form Ax = b with five unknowns: r d , s d , s e , r 0 , and s 0 . Since the rows of A are linearly independent, there exists a solution x to this equation. Therefore P 2 is feasible under this ordering.
Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4
This proof proceeds in two parts. In the first part, we will show that ignoring the set of equations (19) and (20), we can always find a set of t(i) values that satisfy (21)-(23). In the second part, we will show that corresponding to the set of t(i) values found, we can find r c , ∀c ∈ C and f that satisfy (19) and (20) .
Part 1: First, re-index the usage tiers so the index matches the ordering o. Note that after re-ordering, we no longer have the property that g i < g i+1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I − 1}. Now, observe that (21) can be rewritten as t(i) < t(i + 1), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I − 1}. Equation (22) 
The set of inequalities in (43) provide upper bounds on all the t(i) values, and (42) pins down the value of t(a(o)). Notice that these upper bounds are increasing in i, because ∆ S > 0, and I j=i h j g j is decreasing in i. Therefore, there exist values t(i)∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I − 1} that respect (41) and the specified upper bounds.
Part 2: Once a set of values t(i) is found, we need to map them to rate class tariffs r c . To do this, we examine the set of equations (19). Each of these I equations takes the form:
Article submitted to MSOM Sustainable Operations SIG 2018 where m is the index of the rate class corresponding to net usage level d i , and n is the rate class corresponding to net usage level d i − g i . Taken together, these I equations constitute an under-determined linear system of the form A r = t, where r is a |C| dimensional vector of r c values, t is an I dimensional vector of t(i) values, and
A is a matrix with I rows and |C| > I columns. If the rows of A are linearly independent, then the system has an infinite number of solutions. For the sake of contradiction, assume that the rows are linearly dependent.
Then, there must exist an I dimensional vector λ = 0 I×1 such that λ T A = 0 1×|C| . Let m 1 = arg max i d i . Let c 1 be the column in A corresponding to the rate class into which a tier m 1 customer would fall if they did not adopt solar. This column has exactly one non-zero entry because no other household can fall into this rate class, whether they adopt solar or not. Let w 1 be the index of the row in A that contains this non-zero entry. Then, it must be that the w th 1 entry of λ is 0 in order for the c th 1 entry of λ T A to be 0. Therefore, the vector λ T A is unaltered if we replace all entries in the w th 1 row of A by zero. Now, this same argument can be applied repeatedly to assert that all other entries of λ must also be zero: choose m 2 = arg max
the index c 2 of the column corresponding to the rate class to which a tier m 2 customer would belong if it did not adopt solar, and observe that exactly one row corresponding to this column now has a non-zero entry (recall that we changed all entries in row w 1 to 0). Let w 2 be the index of this row. We can assert that the w th 2 entry of λ = 0. By repeating this procedure, we can assert that all entries of λ are 0. This contradicts our assumption, and therefore, the rows of A are linearly independent. Therefore, we can obtain values of r c consistent with the equations (44). These values can then be substituted in (20) to find a feasible f . Q.E.D.
Let ∆ U be chosen so that ∆ C = 0. Therefore, customers as a whole gain exactly 0. We are interested in seeing how close this tariff structure can come to being CS-free. In particular, can customer classes 1, 2, and 3 be financially worse off by an amount arbitrarily close to 0 after solar adoption?
Let every individual household in class 1 be worse off by an amount a 1 , and every individual household in class 2 be worse off by an amount a 2 . Because ∆ C = 0, we have that every household in class 3 is worse off by exactly − a 1 h 1 +a 2 h 2 h 3
. Let z * specify that class 1 adopts, while classes 2 and 3 do not adopt. Since class 1 is the marginal customer, r 2 d 1 + f = r 1 (d 1 − g 1 ) + f + t(1)g 1 : the class 1 customer is equally worse off whether they adopt solar or not. Accordingly, we can write the following system of equations:
We solve these equations for r 2 , r 3 , and r 4 . Next, we use the following profit equation to obtain r 1 :
Substituting r 2 from equation (45) into equation (48), we obtain an equation for r 1 . Using these expressions for r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , and r 4 , we obtain the following expressions for the t(i) values.
t(1) = 6677 89000 ; t(2) = −10a 1 + 10a 2 + 181 1810 ; t(3) = − 89a 1 68600 − 87a 2 24500 + 1 10 Now, consider the two possible orderings that R could induce.
1. t(3) < t(2) < t(1): t(2) < t(1) simplifies to the inequality a 1 > a 2 + 402363 89000
. Therefore, a and b cannot both be made arbitrarily close to 0.
t(2) < t(3) < t(1):
Since this ordering also contains the inequality t(2) < t(1), this ordering also does not allow R to induce a CS-free outcome.
Therefore, this tariff structure does not allow R to induce a CS-free outcome. Q.E.D. I t(j)>t(i)in ordering o · π j h j g j < ∆ S , ∀i = m(o)
